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Allocating Progressive Injury Liability
Among Successive Insurance Policies
Michael G. Dohertyt
Environmental damage and toxic exposure cases often in-
volve injuries that occur over a number of years, known as
"progressive injuries."' One recent case, for example, involved the
cleanup of an industrial site that had been continuously polluted
by oil seepage from the nineteenth century until the 1980s.2 As-
bestos exposure cases are another common example; decades of
exposure may precede the first manifestation of any symptoms of
asbestos-related diseases.3
Progressive injuries frequently occur over time periods in
which a liable party had insurance coverage under several differ-
ent insurance policies, often provided by a number of insurance
companies.4 In most of these cases, it is both scientifically and
administratively impossible to allocate to each policy the liability
' B.S. 1991, State University of New York at Binghamton; J.D. Candidate 1997, The
University of Chicago.
' "Progressive injuries" are also referred to as "progressive damages" or "long tail
injuries." See, for example, Montrose Chemical Corp v Admiral Insurance, 10 Cal 4th 645,
42-Cal Rptr 2d 324, 328 n 6 (1995) (in bank) ("progressive damages"); Owens-Illinois, Inc v
United Insurance Co, 138 NJ 437, 650 A2d 974, 991 (1994) ("long tail injuries").
2 Pittston Co v Allianz Insurance Co, 905 F Supp 1279, 1288 (D NJ 1995).
See, for example, Insurance Co of North America v Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc, 633
F2d 1212, 1214-15 (6th Cir 1980), clarified by 657 F2d 814 (6th Cir 1981) (discussing as-
bestosis, a disease caused by long-term exposure to asbestos).
' Montrose provides a typical example. Montrose Chemical Company is a defendant
in five different environmental and personal injury suits arising out of its manufacture of
the pesticide DDT from 1947 until 1982 (DDT's domestic use was banned in 1972). Be-
tween 1960 and 1986, seven different insurance companies provided Montrose with li-
ability insurance coverage. 42 Cal Rptr 2d at 327.
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for injuries occurring only within its policy period.5 When it is
impossible to determine the proportion of damage that occurred
within each period, the law must allocate damages among the
policies.
Courts disagree about the best method for allocating pro-
gressive injury liability among insurers. Some courts assign li-
ability to one insurer, chosen by the insured, then permit the se-
lected insurer to sue other insurers for contribution. Other courts
allocate the liability among the insurers, with different courts
using different allocation formulas. To further complicate the is-
sue, some insureds may self-insure6 for part of the time during
which the damage occurred. Courts treat such self-insurers in-
consistently. Some courts hold that a self-insurer must share the
liability with the insurance companies; other courts do not.
As a result of this uncertainty over potential liability, many
insurers refuse to write insurance policies covering these types of
risks.7 This uncertainty also reduces the probability of settle-
ment, further increasing the litigation costs borne by the parties
and the judicial system.8 Until courts allocate liability more pre-
dictably, insurers will litigate many claims and demand higher
premiums.9
' See, for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law: An
Analysis of Toxic Tort and Hazardous Waste Insurance Coverage Issues 120-23 (Prentice
Hall Law & Bus 1991).
' Self-insurers choose to manage the risks of their activities internally instead of dis-
tributing them through the purchase of third-party insurance. They often accomplish this
by "setting aside" assets to pay estimated future claims. See generally Robert E. Keeton
and Alan I. Widiss, Insurance Law § 1.3(b)(3) at 13-14 (West 1988).
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev 1458, 1575-76
(1986) ("Facing massive awards ... and fearing further surprises, most insurers have
withdrawn from the environmental liability market."); Andrea Gabor and Maria Recio,
Pollution Insurance: Up in Smoke?, Bus Week 138G (Feb 18, 1985) (The number of insur-
ers providing environmental insurance dropped from more than a dozen to four in the
mid-1980s.); Kenneth S. Abraham, Environmental Liability and the Limits of Insurance,
88 Colum L Rev 942, 944 (1988) (Liability insurance premiums have skyrocketed; for
many businesses these policies are unavailable. The "demise" of the liability insurance
policy is a symptom of increased legal uncertainty faced by insurance companies.). Of
course, the allocation issue is not solely responsible for this uncertainty-toxic tort and
environmental law are suffused with uncertainty. See generally id at 942-45, 955-88.
' William R. Hickman and Mary R. DeYoung, Allocation of Environmental Cleanup
Liability Between Successive Insurers, 17 N Ky L Rev 291, 294 n 6 (1990) (uncertainty has
led to a "litigation bonanza for lawyers"). See also Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis
of Law 555-59 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1992) (As stakes and uncertainty increase, the prob-
ability of settlement decreases and litigation costs increase.).
Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1575-76 (cited in note 7) (suggesting that
insurers will resume selling environmental insurance when they can predict liability
more accurately); Gabor and Recio, Bus Week at 138G (cited in note 7) (premiums in-
creased by a factor of ten from 1983 to 1985); David B. Hilder, Changes in Liability In-
surance Spur Confusion Among Business Clients, Wall St J 33 (Nov 20, 1985).
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The magnitude of the losses in these cases further illustrates
the need for courts to choose one method, and apply it consis-
tently, when allocating liability for progressive injuries. Cleanup
costs for a polluted site can run into the hundreds of millions of
dollars, as can the tort liability faced by a manufacturer of asbes-
tos or other dangerous substances. ° Indeed, one insurance rating
agency estimated that insurers will pay a total of $132 billion for
asbestos and environmental claims." Because of the high stakes
involved, each insurer will vigorously fight to ensure that others,
including the insured, bear a greater share of the total liability.
Thus, some estimate that litigation costs run as high as 75 per-
cent of cleanup costs, at an annual cost of $500 million.'
This Comment discusses the different methods used by
courts to allocate progressive injury liability among insurers.
Section I discusses how a progressive injury claim "triggers" suc-
cessive insurance policies, thereby making an insurer liable for
an insured's liability. Section II discusses the factors that make
one allocation method preferable to others. Section III then ex-
1" See, for example, Kenneth S. Abraham, Cleaning Up the Environmental Liability
Insurance Mess, 27 Valp U L Rev 601, 603-04 (1993) (thirty-million-dollar average cost of
remedying hazardous conditions at sites on Superfund "National Priority List"; several
hundred million dollars at stake in any given suit); Deborah R. Hensler and Mark A. Pe-
terson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
Brooklyn L Rev 961, 962 n 4 (1993) (In 1991, the total value of all pending asbestos
worker injury claims was between eight and fourteen billion dollars.). Trusts established
to pay asbestos claimants have been given the majority of the stock of the Manville Cor-
poration and other asbestos producers. Id at 962 n 5.
" Chris Roush, Fields of Green-And Disaster Areas, Bus Week 94 (Jan 9, 1995)
(estimate of AM. Best). The New York-based actuarial consulting arm of Towers Perrin
has estimated that environmental claims could cost insurers $1 trillion over the next fifty
years. Chris Roush, The Hurricane Called Superfund, Bus Week 74 (Aug 2, 1993). See
also Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law at 1 (cited in note 5) (estimating
the combined cost of hazardous waste cleanup and toxic tort claims at several hundred
billion dollars).
" Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 993, citing the testimony of Dr. Joel Hirschhorn before
the Subcommittee on Policy Research and Insurance of the House Committee on Bank-
ing, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong, 2d Sess 3 (Sept 27, 1990); Reush, Bus Week
(1993) at 74 (cited in note 11) (of the $15 billion spent on Superfund cleanups, 75 percent
has gone to legal fees and related costs).
13 This Comment discusses allocation in the context of both pollution and long-term
toxic exposure cases such as asbestos claims. While the situations are not identical, they
involve many of the same issues. Commentators have noted the parallels:
The dumping or discharge of the waste is akin to initial exposure to (i.e., inhalation
of) asbestos; the leaching of the wastes into the ground and subsurface reservoirs is
similar to exposure in residence; and the property damage ultimately discovered is
analogous to the manifestation of asbestos-related diseases.
Davis J. Howard, "Continuous Trigger" Liability: Application to Toxic Waste Cases and
Impact on the Number of 'Occurrences", 22 Tort & Ins L J 624, 630 (1987). See also Mon-
trose, 42 Cal Rptr 2d at 334 (asserting that property damage and personal injury cases
should have the same insurance coverage rules because of similarity of issues).
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amines the different methods used by courts to allocate damages
among "triggered" policies, and evaluates them using the factors
discussed in Section II. Section IV proposes that courts allocate
liability based on the "time-on-the-risk" method. Under this
method, an insurer's share of total liability is proportional to the
number of years it provided coverage relative to the total number
of years of coverage "triggered." This method is predictable, ad-
ministrable, fundamentally fair, and provides potential insureds
with incentives to purchase insurance or rationally self-insure.
This method will decrease litigation costs, increase the availabil-
ity of liability insurance, and reduce further progressive injury
damages.'4
I. How PROGRESSIVE INJURIES "TRIGGER" SUCCESSIVE
INSURANCE POLICIES
Three basic types of insurance policies cover progressive in-
jury claims. The most frequently used, and litigated, policy is the
Comprehensive General Liability ("CGL") policy. 5 The CGL is a
standard form originally drafted in the 1930s by representatives
of the insurance industry. 6 In order to deal with the problem of
progressive injuries, the CGL was modified in the 1960s from in-
suring against "accidents" to insuring against "occurrences."'
In the standard CGL policy, the insurance company agrees
to pay "those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of 'bodily injury' or 'property damage'
" This Comment assumes that multiple insurers are liable for a progressive injury
claim. It does not discuss pollution exclusion clauses, "owned property exclusions," or
other methods used by insurers to attempt to avoid liability for progressive injury claims.
Compare Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1582-83 (cited in note 7) (Judges have
"gutted" pollution exclusion clauses.), with Jacquelyn A. Beatty, Exclusions Exclude: Let
the Pollution Mean What it Says, 28 Gonzaga L Rev 401, 415 (1993) (pollution exclusions
better respected in more recent cases).
This Comment also assumes that there is no factual way to allocate progressive inju-
ries; thus the court must use a method that allocates liability as a matter of law. How-
ever, not all progressive injuries are impossible to allocate based on the facts of the situa-
tion. See, for example, Uniroyal, Inc v Home Insurance Co, 707 F Supp 1368, 1389, 1393-
94 (E D NY 1988) (using stipulated facts to determine when triggering occurred and to
allocate liability). Because courts tend to maximize insurance coverage in individual
cases, factual allocation may increase the likelihood that a court will strain to use what-
ever facts justify the desired result. See text accompanying notes 57-64.
5 The other two types of policies are the Environmental Impairment Liability ("EIL")
policy and the Insurance Services Office ("ISO") policy. The EIL policy covers all claims
made during the period of the policy. The ISO policy covers all claims made during a de-
fined period. Because the EIL and ISO policies are infrequently used and even less fre-
quently the subject of allocation litigation, they will not be discussed in this Comment.
S See Michael Dore, Insurance Coverage for Toxic Tort Claims: Solving the Self-
Insurance Allocation Dilemma, 28 Tort & Ins L J 823, 823-24 (1993).
" Id at 824.
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[caused by an occurrence] to which this insurance applies....
[The insurance company has] the right and duty to defend any
'suit' seeking those damages.""8  The policy defines an
"occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated
exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."19
Most policies also contain a provision that, "[flor the purpose of
determining the limit of the company's liability, all bodily injury
and property damage arising out of continuous or repeated expo-
sure to substantially the same general conditions, shall be con-
sidered as arising out of one occurrence.""
Two fundamental problems recur in applying CGL policies to
progressive injury claims. First, when is coverage "triggered"?
Second, how many "occurrences" are necessary for a progressive
injury?
A. Triggering Coverage
"Trigger" is a label for the events that determine whether an
insurance company must respond to a claim against an insured.2
Ordinarily, an injury within the effective dates of a policy trig-
gers that policy.22 A "triggering" question arises, however, when
different insurers have insured a company whose products or ac-
tions have caused injuries to persons or property at different or
uncertain times.23 Asbestos exposure and environmental pollu-
tion, for example, often occur over more than one policy period.24
Theoretically, damages that occur in different policy periods are
divisible. In practice, however, the harms are cumulative with,
and thus indivisible from, harms suffered in earlier periods."
Which policies have been triggered?
Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law, appendix J(1) at 1243 (cited in note 6).
" Id at 1251.
' Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 293 n 4 (cited in note 8). See also Insur-
ance Co of North America v Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc, 633 F2d 1212, 1227-28 (6th Cir
1980), clarified by 657 F2d 814 (6th Cir 1981) (presenting the basically identical language
of all the different insurance policies in question); Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North
America, 667 F2d 1034, 1053-57 (DC Cir 1981) (same).
" Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 970-71 (cited in note 7); Montrose Chemical Corp v
Admiral Insurance Co, 10 Cal 4th 645, 42 Cal Rptr 2d 324, 326-27 n 2 (1995) (in bank).
Uniroyal, Inc v Home Insurance Co, 707 F Supp 1368, 1387 (E D NY 1988).
Id.
Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law at 98-102 (cited in note 5).
Id at 100-02. For an example of conflicting judicial views about when damages ac-
tually occur, compare Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 682
F2d 12, 18 (1st Cir 1982) (Asbestos inhalations do not inevitably result in injury.), with
Owens-Illinois, Inc v United Insurance Co, 138 NJ 437, 650 A2d 974, 982-83 (1994) (Some
injury occurs upon inhalation of asbestos.).
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In order to answer this question, courts have developed four
different theories for fixing the date of injury when the time of
the actual injury cannot be ascertained.28 The "exposure" theory
fixes the date of injury as the date on which the injury-producing
agent first contacted the body or 'the date on which pollution be-
gan. The "manifestation" theory holds that the compensable
injury does not occur until it manifests itself in the form of a di-
agnosable disease or ascertainable property damage.28 The
"continuous trigger" theory, also known as the "triple trigger"
theory, provides that the injury occurs continuously from expo-
sure until manifestation.2" Finally, the "injury-in-fact" theory al-
lows the finder of fact to place the injury at any point in time
that the effects of exposure resulted in an actual and compensa-
ble injury."° Injury-in-fact can occur at exposure, at manifesta-
tion, or at any time in between." In practice, the inability to pin
down, or even to approximate, when the injury-in-fact occurred
often causes this test to yield the same result as the "continuous
trigger" test.2
In order to be consistent with the majority of courts that
have considered the issue, this Comment will assume the use of a
continuous trigger, or a similarly applied injury-in-fact trigger, to
answer the triggering question.3
"For a state-by-state breakdown of "trigger law," see generally Martin J. McMahon,
Event Triggering Liability Insurance Coverage as Occurring Within Period of Time Cov-
ered by Liability Insurance Policy Where Injury or Damage is Delayed-Modern Cases, 14
ALR5th 695 (1993).
See, for example, Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F2d at 1223; Cole v Celotex Corp, 599
S2d 1058, 1076 (La 1992); Commercial Union Insurance Co v Sepco Corp, 765 F2d 1543,
1546 (11th Cir 1985).
See, for example, Eagle-Picher, 682 F2d at 24-25; Mraz v Canadian Universal In-
surance Co, Ltd, 804 F2d 1325, 1328 (4th Cir 1986).
See, for example, Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North America, 667 F2d 1034, 1042-
47 (DC Cir 1981); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v American Home Assurance Co, 613 F
Supp 1549, 1560-61 (D NJ 1985); Montrose, 42 Cal Rptr 2d at 347.
" See, for example, American Home Products Corp v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co,
748 F2d 760, 764-66 (2d Cir 1984); Abex Corp v Maryland Casualty Co, 790 F2d 119, 127-
28 (DC Cir 1986).
" Uniroyal, Inc v Home Insurance Co, 707 F Supp 1368, 1388 (E D NY 1988).
"See, for example, Sentinel Insurance Co v First Insurance Co of Hawaii, Ltd, 76
Hawaii 277, 875 P2d 894, 917-18 (1994) (adopting injury-in-fact trigger but stating that
the injury-in-fact can occur over a continuous period, giving rise to the use of a continu-
ous trigger); United States Gypsum Co v Admiral Insurance Co, 268 Ill App 3d 598, 643
NE2d 1226, 1255 (1994) ("Conceptually, the injury in fact trigger and the continuous trig-
ger are on the same continuum and are complementary, rather than mutually exclu-
sive.").
' Other commentators have used this method when discussing the allocation issue.
See Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 295-96, 300 (cited in note 8). See also Mon-
trose, 42 Cal Rptr 2d at 342, 348 n 22 (observing that most courts deciding CGL cases use
the "continuous trigger" method).
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B. The Number of Occurrences
Courts use "the number of occurrences" as a factor to deter-
mine the amount of liability an insured must absorb before being
indemnified." Most insurance policies limit the total amount that
may be paid per occurrence by providing that the insured must
absorb a specified deductible for each occurrence before the in-
surer becomes liable and by limiting the total amount of coverage
per occurrence."
The standard CGL language does not equate the
"occurrence" with the injury; instead, it defines the injury as re-
sulting from the occurrence."5 As noted by the Sixth Circuit:
The vast majority of courts... have concluded that although
injury must be suffered before an insured can be held liable,
the number of occurrences for purposes of applying coverage
limitations is determined by referring to the cause or causes
of the damage and not to the number of injuries or claims.
The number and timing of injuries is relevant in addressing
the distinct question of the policy period to which each in-
jury will be assigned."
This Comment will assume that there is one occurrence for
the purpose of allocating insurance liability. The CGL language,
when applied to the typical progressive injury fact pattern, sup-
ports this assumption. "For the purpose of determining the limit
of the company's liability, all bodily injury and property damage
arising out of continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the
same general conditions, shall be considered as arising out of one
occurrence."
38
See Uniroyal, 707 F Supp at 1379-80. The use of "indemnify" is somewhat inexact.
The insurer does not pay or indemnify the insured; it pays an injured party "on behalf of
the insured." However, "indemnify" is the term customarily used by both courts and
commentators. Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 312 n 66 (cited in note 8).
Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1582 (cited in note 7).
Uniroyal, 707 F Supp at 1380.
Michigan Chemical Corp v American Home Assurance Co, 728 F2d 374, 379 (6th Cir
1984) (citations omitted).
' Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 293 n 4 (cited in note 8) (emphasis
added). The majority of courts focus on the "cause" of the injury when determining the
number of occurrences. Id at 297. See also, for example, Uniroyal, 707 F Supp at 1383
(finding production of Agent Orange was one occurrence because it encompassed a series
of continuous and interrelated actions). But see Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at
1582 (citc'd in note 7) (A court attempting to maximize total insurance coverage will find
th.t multiple occurrences occurred if policy has low deductible and low total limits per oc-
currence.).
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II. THE QUALITIES OF THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION METHOD
This Section argues that the optimal allocation method
should minimize the total costs that progressive injuries impose
on society and increase the availability of liability insurance.
Contrary to the inclination of some courts, however, the alloca-
tion method should not attempt to maximize total insurance cov-
erage in individual allocation cases.
A. Minimizing Total Costs
The overriding goal of any method for allocating liability
should be to minimize the total costs that progressive injuries
impose on society. Progressive injury cases impose four types of
costs: (1) avoidance costs-the costs of preventing harm by, for
example, using expensive alternative materials or processes; (2)
abatement costs-the costs of fixing the harm that has occurred
by, for example, cleaning up a hazardous waste site; (3) compen-
sation costs-the costs of making whole those who have been
harmed by, for example, compensating victims who have inhaled
asbestos and, thereby, developed asbestosis; and (4) transaction
costs--the costs of allocating avoidance, abatement, and compen-
sation costs among "responsible parties," insureds, victims, gov-
ernment, insurers, and third parties. 9 Efficiency requires that
any solution attempt to minimize all four costs. 40
While fairness is another concern, cost-based efficiency
analysis considers fairness. Of course, making a polluter pay for
the costs of pollution forces the polluter to internalize those costs,
thereby giving it a strong incentive to minimize them. But fair-
ness also requires consistent application of rules and predictable
results. Simplistic application of slogans like "make the polluter
pay" can yield wildly unpredictable results.4'
See Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1482 (cited in note 7). The Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"),
Pub L No 96-510, 94 Stat 2767, codified at 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq (1994), also known as
the "Superfund" law, defines "responsible parties" as including past or present owners or
operators of a cleanup site, transporters of hazardous material to a site, and any party
who generated material deposited at a site. 42 USC § 9607(a).
See Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1477-80 (cited in note 7).
Results are especially unpredictable in cases where the plaintiff seeks to make a
polluter retroactively liable for the full cost of cleanup even though the polluter only has
contributed a small amount to the total pollution. Under CERCLA, liability of
"responsible parties" for environmental damages is "strict, retroactive, and (except when
the harm caused by different parties is divisible) joint and several," with extremely lim-
ited defenses to liability. Abraham, 27 Valp U L Rev at 603 (cited in note 10) (footnotes
omitted). For a definition of "responsible parties," see note 39.
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By the time allocation cases reach the courts, progressive
injuries have already occurred. Thus, the avoidance, abatement,
and compensation costs discussed above are "sunk" costs that are
unaffected by the allocation decision, although the allocation de-
cision determines the distribution of these costs among the par-
ties.42 It follows that, since the allocation rule cannot alter sunk
costs, it should focus instead on minimizing transaction costs.
The transaction costs of allocating avoidance, abatement,
and compensation are substantial. Environmental litigation costs
are estimated at as much as $500 million per year.' Indeed, for
each dollar spent on the indemnification of asbestos claims, more
than two dollars are expended on litigation and other transaction
costs." These transaction costs are wasted costs; they only allo-
cate environmental damages but do not control them. Of course,
insurers will factor these costs into their premium calculations
and further increase the price of insurance.45
B. The Availability Of Insurance
In addition to minimizing transaction costs, the choice of al-
location method can also indirectly affect the availability of Ii-
ability insurance. This, in turn, indirectly affects the costs that
progressive injuries impose on society. A healthy liability insur-
ance market helps to deter progressive injuries, achieve correc-
tive justice, and compensate victims.46 High levels of uncertainty,
reflected in high premiums and the unwillingness to write insur-
ance policies, have helped cause the "demise of the environ-
mental liability insurance market."" If this uncertainty is not re-
duced, and if litigation costs, in large part borne by insurance
companies and thus reflected in premiums, are not decreased, in-
surance will not be available to help reduce total progressive in-
jury costs.8
Insurance helps to reduce the costs of progressive injuries in
three ways. First, it spreads risk from those who are risk averse
to other more willing and more efficient risk bearers.49 As noted
by the New Jersey Supreme Court, because insurers are more ef-
ficient risk bearers, any allocation method should, "at a mini-
4 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 5-10 (cited in note 8).
See text accompanying notes 10-12.
Hensler and Peterson, 59 Brooklyn L Rev at 962 n 4 (cited in note 10).
See text accompanying notes 60-63.
Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 944-45 (cited in note 7).
"Id at 944.
See Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1575-76 (cited in note 7).
See Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 945-46 (cited in note 7).
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mum, not provide disincentives to ... acquire insurance."" Sec-
ond, insurance promotes safety. By tailoring premiums to the
level of risk incurred, insurance forces insured companies to in-
ternalize the costs of their activities.5 Insurance also helps those
companies assess and manage the risks involved in their activi-
ties. 2
Finally, insurance also reduces the costs of progressive inju-
ries by decreasing the risk of bankruptcy. If insurance is un-
available, a company is more likely to go bankrupt due to the
threat of tremendous liability. 3 Companies can discount the
value of possible claims against them by the probability of
avoiding many of these claims through bankruptcy.54 This, in
turn, allows companies to avoid internalizing the costs of these
activities and leads to larger progressive injury costs.55 As an al-
ternative to courting bankruptcy by operating without insurance,
some companies will simply discontinue their operations. 6
C. Rejecting Coverage Maximization
Many courts use a "coverage maximization" rationale to allo-
cate liability for progressive injuries." Too often, courts choose
Owens-Illinois, Inc v United Insurance Co, 138 NJ 437, 950 A2d 974, 992 (1994).
S, Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 954-55 (cited in note 7).
52 Insurers set premiums after performing detailed studies of an insured's practices
and comparing these practices with those of other companies participating in similar ac-
tivities. Insurers then inform insureds of the risks they face and advise them of precau-
tions that can minimize the expected future damages caused by these activities. Id.
See Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1585-86 (cited in note 7) (Risking
bankruptcy instead of insuring is increasingly the route chosen by companies.). See also
Kaighn Smith, Jr., Comment, Beyond the Equity Power of Bankruptcy Courts: Toxic Tort
Liabilities in Chapter 11 Cases, 38 Me L Rev 391, 391-92 (1986) (discussing four compa-
nies that declared bankruptcy because of mounting asbestos-related claims). See gener-
ally Wilbur N. Moulton, et al, Business Failure Pathways: Environmental Stress and Or-
ganizational Response, J Mgmt, 1996 WL 10589404 (discussing reasons for firm bank-
ruptcies).
' A full discussion of the treatment of progressive injury claims in bankruptcy is be-
yond the scope of this Comment. For a more thorough discussion, see Toxic Waste Litiga-
tion, 99 Harv L Rev at 1585-1601 (cited in note 7).
" Id at 1592, 1597-98.
Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 948 (cited in note 7) (noting that "liability insurance
is as important to many enterprises as electricity").
, See American Home Products Corp v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 565 F Supp
1485, 1510 (S D NY 1983), affirmed as modified, 748 F2d 760 (2d Cir 1984) (stating that
coverage maximization is the driving rationale behind most allocation decisions and dis-
approving of this tendency); Owens-Illinois, Inc v United Insurance Co, 138 NJ 437, 650
A2d 974, 981 (agreeing with American Home Products); Lac D'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v
American Home Assurance, 613 F Supp 1549, 1551 (D NJ 1985) (stating that different
outcomes are result of courts' desire to maximize coverage and calling this result
"understandable"). See also Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 315 (cited in note
8) (stating that the "proliferation of different theories" of coverage allocation is best ex-
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this method because it allocates the most liability to insurers and
the least to the insured in a particular case." There are several
reasons, however, why courts should reject this rationale for allo-
cating liability.
In the long term, coverage maximization produces both inef-
ficient and unfair results. As noted by the court in American
Home Products Corp v Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, "broader
coverage has a price that must ultimately be paid."9 Insurers
calculate premiums to equal the sum of total expected liability
within the policy period, plus a reserve in case they underesti-
mate future losses, plus expenses and expected profit.6" Thus, if
insurance companies anticipate an increase in future liabilities
resulting from courts' attempts to maximize coverage in individ-
ual cases, they will raise their premiums to reflect the expected
increased liability." In addition, if insurers cannot accurately
predict their future liabilities because courts allocate liability on
a case-by-case basis, premiums will further increase to reflect
this uncertainty.62 The uncertainty flowing from coverage maxi-
mization increases the range of possible outcomes of the case be-
cause insurers cannot know when determining premiums which
rule the court will apply. Such uncertainty also decreases the
likelihood of settlement, thereby increasing the costs of litiga-
tion. 3
Finally, coverage maximization reduces the incentives for in-
sureds to discover and limit progressive injury damage. If insur-
ers pay more of the insured's liability, the insured must pay less
and consequently will be less concerned about limiting injury."
Of course, future premiums will reflect increased liability, but
plained as "judicially adopted public policy of maximizing coverage").
See, for example, Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North America, 667 F2d 1034, 1048
(DC Cir 1981) (i[lndispensible initial premise" of decision is that the insured has the
"right to be free of all liability.").
' 565 F Supp 1485, 1511 (S D NY 1983), affirmed as modified, 748 F2d 760 (2d Cir
1984).
See generally Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law § 1.3(b) at 11-13 (cited in note 6).
See also American Home Products, 565 F Supp at 1506-08 (providing example of how in-
surance rates are calculated and negotiated between insured and insurer).
" American Home Products, 565 F Supp at 1511 (noting that insurance premiums
rise in anticipation of judicially-created liabilities).
See Abraham, 88 Colun L Rev at 944 (cited in note 7) ("The demise of the environ-
mental liability insurance market is a symptom of... high levels of legal uncertainty.").
See generally id at 944-56. This increased legal uncertainty adversely affects self-insurers
as well as insurance companies. Id at 948-49.
Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 312 (cited in note 8). See also Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law at 555-59 (cited in note 8) (the greater the uncertainty and gap
between possible outcomes, the less the likelihood of settlement).
" Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 303 (cited in note 8).
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this threatened increase may not worry an insured that knows
its hazardous activity will decrease or that plans to self-insure in
the future.
Courts attempt to justify coverage maximization in two
ways. First, they appeal to the doctrine of "reasonable expecta-
tions." According to this doctrine, an insurer is liable for the cov-
erage that an insured would reasonably expect to be provided by
the policy in question.65 However, the doctrine of reasonable ex-
pectations applies only when the expectations to be enforced are
strongly demonstrated, and the policy in question is an adhesion
contract.66 As Judge Wald noted, insureds cannot have reason-
able expectations of receiving coverage for which they have not
paid.67 Furthermore, it is questionable whether assessing reason-
able expectations is even possible when both scientific knowledge
and the legal rules affecting liability, factors which combine to
determine the size and the allocation of liability, change fre-
quently." Finally, an insured's reasonable expectations must also
be a function of the legal rule applied by courts; if courts consis-
tently apply a rule that does not maximize coverage, an insured
can have no reasonable expectation of coverage maximization.
Courts also attempt to justify coverage maximization by con-
struing any ambiguities in a policy against the insurer. There are
three reasons why this construction does not justify coverage
maximization. First, this doctrine does not apply to powerful and
sophisticated insureds who can quite ably protect themselves
against contracts of adhesion.69 Second, the language in the in-
surance policy does not ambiguously suggest several allowable
allocation methods, one of which is most favorable to the insured.
Indeed, the policy does not address the allocation issue at all be-
cause the allocation issue arises outside the scope of the insur-
ance contract, designed to bind one insured to one insurer. ° Fi-
nally, even when the insured is a small- to medium-sized com-
pany that may not be able fully to protect itself against contracts
of adhesion, applying this doctrine to maximize coverage in indi-
See generally Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law §§ 6.1(a), 6.3 at 614-16, 627-46
(cited in note 6).
"Compare American Home Products, 565 F Supp at 1511 (reasonable expectations
inapplicable in allocation cases), with Keene, 667 F2d at 1041-42 (relying on reasonable
expectations doctrine to maximize coverage).
"Keene, 667 F2d at 1058 (Wald concurring in part).
Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 991. Because CERCLA imposes joint and several retro-
active liability on polluters, see notes 39 and 41, the court questioned how an insured
could develop any expectations about the allocation of this liability.
See, for example, Pittston Co v Allianz Insurance Co, 905 F Supp 1279, 1320 (D NJ
1995).
" Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 989. See also note 73.
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vidual cases will, in the long term, increase insurance premiums
and cause the adverse effects described above.'
III. ALLOCATION METHODS USED BY COURTS
As discussed above, it is often impossible for courts to de-
termine the amount of progressive injury damage that occurred
within a given policy period. 2 In addition, the standard CGL
policy is of little assistance because it does not address the allo-
cation of progressive injury liability among successive insurance
policies.7'3 As a result, courts have used a number of different
methods in attempting to fill this gap. This Section discusses and
critiques each of those methods.
A. The "Joint and Several Liability" Method
Several courts have held that each "triggered" insurer is
jointly and severally liable for the insured's entire indemnity and
defense costs. The seminal case embracing this approach is Keene
Corp v Insurance Co of North America, in which the D.C. Circuit
held that each triggered insurer was jointly and severally liable
for the indemnity and defense costs resulting from a rash of as-
bestos-related lawsuits against the insured, including periods
during which Keene had self-insured. '4 The court allowed the in-
sured to select one triggered policy that would be responsible for
the full amount, subject to the policy's deductible and coverage
limits; a triggered policy could escape liability only if the insurer
could prove that none of the injuries at issue could have occurred
during its coverage period. 5 After liability was assessed, the se-
lected insurance carrier could sue (or negotiate with) other trig-
gered insurers for contribution.
The reasoning behind the joint and several liability method,
as illustrated by Keene, begins with the premise that the insured
purchased from its insurers the right to be free from all liability.
See text accompanying notes 57-64.
See text accompanying notes 4-5, 22-25.
See, for example, Keene Corp v Insurance Co of North America, 667 F2d 1034, 1041
(DC Cir 1981) ("Unfortunately, the insurance companies failed to develop policy language
that would directly address the full complexity entailed by asbestos-related diseases.").
" 667 F2d 1034, 1049-50 (DC Cir 1981) (Bazelon opinion). For other cases using this
method, see Monsanto Co v CE Health Compensation and Liability Insurance Co, 652 A2d
30, 35 n 6 (Del 1994) (calling joint and several liability the "majority rule" and citing
cases).
' Keene, 667 F2d at 1052. Normally the burden to prove coverage is on the insured,
but the court reversed this presumption and noted that "[r]eversal of the ordinary burden
of proof will be more equitable for all parties and will prevent unnecessary litigation." Id
at 1052 n 42.
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It follows that, if the insured's damages are allocated among dif-
ferent policies, each policy fails in its primary function of reliev-
ing the insured of its liability by denying the coverage purchased
by the insured. 6 Therefore, the argument concludes, the insured
ought to be permitted to select one insurer to indemnify it up to
the limits of the policy selected. Presumably, the insured will
pick the policy that minimizes its out-of-pocket expenses.
Keene's reasoning relies on a faulty premise to reach an inef-
ficient result. Indeed, as the New Jersey Supreme Court ob-
served, shoehorning all damages into one policy period is
"intuitively suspect" and inconsistent with the development of
toxic tort jurisprudence.7 An insured purchases an insurance
policy to indemnify it against injuries occurring within the policy
period, not injuries occurring outside that period. Because an in-
sured can select any one of the triggered policies, the Keene
method implicitly admits that some damages occurred outside
the selected policy period. However, in Keene, the court nonethe-
less pretended that all the damages occurred within the coverage
period of the selected policy.
The Keene method also repudiates its own reasoning by al-
lowing the selected insurer to seek contribution from other trig-
gered insurers. After all, if the reasoning behind joint and several
liability is to force the insurer to provide the coverage paid for, it
does not follow that the selected insurer should be allowed to
force other insurers to help provide that coverage.7" Indeed, un-
der this reasoning, an insurer should be liable for damage occur-
ring within its policy period, and nothing more.
Keene's faulty reasoning might be excusable if it yielded effi-
cient results, but it does not. Under Keene, the selected insurer
can sue or negotiate with the other triggered insurers for contri-
bution. However, Keene suggests no method that allocates dam-
ages among the insurers; it proposes only to allocate liability by
using facts or "other insurance" clauses. But this approach
overlooks the fact that, if courts could allocate liability based on
the facts of the case, there would be no need for a legal rule-
each insurer would be liable for the damages that actually oc-
curred under its policy. As discussed above, however, progressive
Id at 1047-49.
Owens-Illinois, Inc v United Insurance Co, 138 NJ 437, 650 A2d 974, 989 (1994).
"Id at 987.
Keene, 667 F2d at 1051-52. Keene suggested only that damages be allocated using
the facts developed in the underlying tort litigation or the "other insurance" clauses in
the triggered policies. Id at 1050-52. For a discussion of the fact-based method and its
shortcomings, see note 14. For a discussion of why "other insurance" clauses do not solve
the allocation dilemma, see Section III.D.
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injury claims are problematic precisely because courts cannot de-
termine exactly when actual injuries occurred."
Thus, Keene does not solve the allocation problem; it merely
postpones it. Indeed, the joint and several method divides the
case into two separate suits: in the first suit, the insured selects
and sues one of the triggered insurers; in the second suit, the se-
lected insurer then sues other triggered insurers for contribu-
tion."1 Litigation costs do not decrease, courts lack a method for
allocating liability, and insurers still need to factor the costs of
uncertain liability into their premiums.
The Keene method could avoid the costs of contribution suits
by prohibiting contribution, but wasteful litigation costs would
still remain: an insurer that provides insurance for one year
could be saddled with liability for injuries occurring over a dec-
ades-long period. A selected insurer faced with the prospect of
paying a mammoth amount of damages with no hope of contribu-
tion would have a strong incentive to drag out the litigation,
hoping to extract a more favorable settlement.82 Moreover, be-
cause the insurer has the duty to defend as well as indemnify the
insured,83 it would have an incentive to expend socially wasteful
litigation costs in an effort to allocate a greater share of the dam-
age costs to the other parties."
In addition, under the Keene method, insurers need to factor
into their premiums the possibility of compensating for injuries
outside the policy period. Thus, if all courts adopted the Keene
method, premiums would naturally rise and exacerbate the ex-
isting insurance crisis. Furthermore, insurers, knowing that an
insured will likely select the policy providing the most coverage,
would be discouraged from writing generous (high-coverage) poli-
' See text accompanying notes 4-5 and 22-25.
" Keene, 667 F2d at 1051. See also Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 315
(cited in note 8) ("[It has been judicial inability or refusal to squarely face the allocation
problem, compounded by attempts to avoid the problem by pretending to impose joint and
several liability, which has led to the substantial confusion presently surrounding the al-
location question.").
' Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 555-59 (cited in note 8) (demonstrating that
increased litigation stakes increase litigation expenditures and decrease probability of
settlement).
See Section IV.
Indeed, the selected insurer will continue to litigate as long as the costs of litigation
are less than the amount of damages allocated away from the insurer and to the other
parties. See, for example, Alan 0. Sykes, Judicial Limitations on the Discretion of Liabil-
ity Insurers to Settle or Litigate: An Economic Critique, 72 Tex L Rev 1345, 1345-46 (1994)
(demonstrating that insurer has incentive to litigate if it can allocate more losses to other
parties than it spends litigating). Presumably, in the course of defending the insured, the
insurer will first dispute the insured's liability. It may then dispute the amount owed the
insured for indemnification.
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cies because the increased probability of selection would increase
the likelihood of paying for injuries occurring outside the policy
period.
The Keene method is also unfair; it refuses to hold the in-
sured liable for periods of self-insurance. An insurer that pro-
vided coverage for one year might have to pay for all injuries oc-
curring during a nineteen-year period, even if the insured did not
have insurance for the other eighteen years.85 Such a result ig-
nores the reality of the insurance market. Companies decide to
self-insure when they conclude that self-insurance costs less than
third-party insurance.86 The court in Keene reasoned that, by con-
tracting with the insured, the insurance companies agreed to re-
lieve the insured of all liability, even during periods of self-
insurance.87 Despite this assertion, self-insurers do expect to be
liable for injuries caused during the self-insured periods. Indeed,
they often hire management companies to determine the amount
of reserves that should be set aside for claims and to manage the
self-insurance effort.88
Furthermore, relieving a self-insurer of liability for injuries
occurring during the self-insured periods allows the self-insurer
to externalize costs. A company that pays insurance premiums
will be encouraged to take precautions against injuries, because
insurers tailor premiums to reflect expected losses. Similarly, a
self-insurer will take precautions knowing that it will pay di-
rectly for the costs of injuries. By forcing a third-party insurer to
Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 992-93, citing Insurance Co of North America v Forty-
Eight Insulations, Inc, 633 F2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir 1980), clarified by 657 F2d 814 (6th
Cir 1981). See also Keene, 667 F2d at 1058 (Wald concurring in part) (advocating the
time-on-the-risk method with allocation to insured for periods of self-insurance).
See, for example, American Home Products, 565 F Supp at 1507-08 (describing how
American Home Products' insurance manager decided that self-insurance was the most
economically attractive method). See also Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 948 (cited in note
7) (discussing how a company compares costs of third-party insurance with self-insurance
and selects the alternative that melds best with its capital structure).
Keene, 667 F2d at 1049.
See Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 976-77 (describing Owens-Illinois's self-insurance ef-
fort, which included hiring a management company and forming a wholly-owned captive
insurance company). As Judge Wald observed in Keene:
I just do not understand why an asbestos manufacturer, which has consciously de-
cided not to insure itself during particular years of the exposure-manifestation pe-
riod, should have a reasonable expectation that it would be exempt from any liability
for injuries that were occurring during the uninsured period.... [A]ll those who vol-
untarily assumed risk during the period when the diseases progressed must share
the responsibility for the judgment and this includes self-insurers [or else] a manu-
facturing company that purchased insurance intermittently during the risk period
would be as secure as those prudent companies that continually purchased insur-
ance.
Keene, 667 F2d at 1058 (Wald concurring in part).
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pay for injuries occurring during the self-insured period, the
Keene method gives a self-insurer no incentive to internalize the
costs of its actions and take precautions against causing progres-
sive injuries during self-insured periods. 9
B. The "Stacking Coverage" Method
"Stacking" permits the insured to aggregate the coverage
limits of triggered policies, thereby creating a larger pool out of
which the insured may be compensated." Also known as
"horizontal exhaustion," this method allows the insured to ex-
haust the coverage limits of all the policies up to the level of its
loss." For example, a two-year progressive injury that triggered
successive insurance policies A (with a coverage limit of $1 mil-
lion) and B (with a coverage limit of $2 million) would, if stacked,
allow the insured to recover up to $3 million for the injury.
Stacking allows the insured to select any triggered policy. When
the insured reaches the limits of the first policy selected, it se-
lects another triggered policy and continues until it either ex-
hausts all the policies or it is fully indemnified.2
One court has suggested that a selected insurer might be
permitted to sue other triggered insurers for contribution when
the injury does not exhaust the coverage limits of all the trig-
gered policies. 3 If the progressive injury in the above example re-
sulted in damages of $1.5 million, the insured would presumably
select B, the larger policy. Policy B's limits would not be reached,
but perhaps insurer B could then sue A for contribution.
Because courts suggest that the insurers selected to indem-
nify the insured can sue other triggered insurers for contribution,
See text accompanying notes 46-56.
Abraham, Environmental Liability Insurance Law at 123-26 (cited in note 5). Some
controversy exists as to the frequency of this method's use. Some commentators suggest it
is used infrequently, see Cole v Celotex Corp, 599 S2d 1058, 1077 n 56 (La 1992), citing
Neil H. Selman, Exposure to a Manifest Injustice: the Argument Against Horizontal Stack-
ing in Latent Injury and Damage Cases, 5 Mealey's Litigation Reports: Insurance 16, 25
(1990) (noting that only Louisiana continues to use "stacking"). See also J.H. France Re-
fractories Co v Allstate Ipsurance Co, 534 Pa 29, 626 A2d 502, 509 (1993) ("When the pol-
icy limits of a given insurer are exhausted, [the insured] is entitled to seek indemnifica-
tion from any of the remaining insurers which was on the risk during the development of
the disease.").
'1 Uniroyal, Inc v Home Insurance Co, 707 F Supp 1368, 1392 (E D NY 1988).
J.H. France, 626 A2d at 508-09; Cole, 599 S2d at 1077-80. It is unclear whether the
insured would have to meet the deductible, if any, for each selected policy. Uniroyal sug-
gests, without deciding, that all deductibles must be met. 707 F Supp at 1391. Cole and
J.H. France are silent on this issue. However, the tendency of courts to maximize cover-
age in individual cases, see notes 57-58 and accompanying text, suggests that insureds
would need to meet but one deductible.
See J.H. France, 626 A2d at 509, citing Keene, 667 F2d at 1050.
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the stacking method, like the joint and several liability method,
threatens to be little more than a method to split the case into
two suits. A selected insurer will sue the other insurers for con-
tribution, and the courts, still without a rule, will then face the
familiar allocation question. 4
Even if courts prohibit contribution, stacking suffers the
same problems that make the Keene method unacceptable. As
discussed above,95 an insurer, if forced to pay for injuries largely
sustained outside the policy period, will increase premiums and
engage in wasteful litigation. More ominously, while Keene limits
total recovery to the limits of one policy, the stacking method po-
tentially reaches the limits of all the triggered policies. This
magnifies the problems with coverage maximization, inherent in
the joint and several liability method. Finally, like Keene, stack-
ing forces insurers to provide insurance coverage during periods
of self-insurance. As discussed above, such an approach ignores
the reality of the insurance market, increases premiums, and re-
duces the availability of insurance.96
C. The "Coverage Provided" Method
In Owens-Illinois, Inc v United Insurance Co, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recently allocated liability for asbestos-related
claims based on the "coverage provided" by each insurer.97
Roughly speaking, "coverage provided" is determined by multi-
plying the years the insurer provided coverage by the coverage
limits of the policies.98 The court reasoned that insurers who pro-
vided more coverage, that is, higher limits or lower deductibles,
, See text accompanying notes 79-81. The J.H. France court vaguely suggested, with-
out any discussion, that the policies' "other insurance" clauses could be used to apportion
liability. J.H. France, 626 A2d at 509. For a discussion of why these clauses are not appli-
cable to progressive injury allocation, see Section III.D.
See text accompanying notes 82-84.
See text accompanying notes 85-89.
138 NJ 437, 650 A2d 974 (1994).
A series of recent opinions in California state court offers a comparison of the
Owens-Illinois approach with other approaches. Compare Armstrong World Industries,
Inc v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 45 Cal App 4th 1, 52 Cal Rptr 2d 690, 705-11 (1996)
(imposing joint and several liability, including during periods of self-insurance, and en-
couraging contribution based on years of coverage multiplied by policy limits), with Imer-
ica Group, Inc v Liberty Mutual Co, 47 Cal App 4th 699, 50 Cal Rptr 2d 583, 608-11, re-
view granted, 54 Cal Rptr 2d 41 (1996) (using fact-based allocation to allocate defense
costs and requiring insurer to pay for costs defending claims involving damage that oc-
curred during uninsured periods). The Imerica court also held that the insured should be
responsible for defense costs incurred defending claims involving damage that occurred
during uninsured periods. Id at 608-09. See also Stonewall Insurance Co v City of Palos
Verdes Estates, 46 Cal App 4th 1810, 54 Cal Rptr 2d 176, 206 (Cal Ct App 1996) (adopting
time-on-the-risk as the "fairest" method).
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assumed more of the risk of liability than insurers who provided
less coverage. The court then held that each insurer would be li-
able for that portion of the liability corresponding to the ratio of
the total coverage provided by that insurer to the total coverage
provided by all the triggered policies.
A simplified example will help explain this method.9 As-
sume that XYZ's employees are exposed to asbestos for the nine
years they work in XYZ's building. At the end of the nine years,
the employees develop asbestosis, but it is impossible to deter-
mine when damage to the employees' lungs reached the point of
diagnosable injury. Unable to identify the point of injury, the
court applies a continuous trigger, triggering all insurance poli-
cies in effect from years one through nine. Further assume that
in years one through three, insurer A provided coverage with a
policy limit of $2 million per year. In years four through six, in-
surer B covered XYZ with a policy with limits of $3 million per
year, and in years seven through nine insurer C provided cover-
age with policy limits of $4 million per year. Under the Owens-
Illinois method, the total coverage provided by the triggered poli-
cies equals $27 million (2 + 2 + 2 + 3 + 3 + 3 + 4 + 4 + 4 = 27). In-
surer A provided coverage for three years with a limit of $2 mil-
lion per year, so A would be liable for 6/27 of the total liability (3
years * $2 million per year). Insurer B would be liable for 9/27 of
the total liability (3 years * $3 million per year), and C would be
liable for 12/27 (3 years * $4 million per year).0 °
The Owens-Illinois court also held that a company that did
not have insurance for a period during the injury must share in
the loss as if it were an insurer. This holding requires a determi-
nation of how much risk the self-insurer assumed during that
time, that is, how much coverage the self-insurer "provided." The
court stated that a special master would develop the actual allo-
The following example was adapted from Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 994.
"The court recognized that deductibles, coinsurance, excess insurance, and other
risk-sharing techniques would complicate the allocation formula. Id. "Coinsurance" refers
to an insurance risk-sharing technique by which the insurer and the insured divide the
liability for each dollar of loss. For example, if XYZ's insurance policy had a coinsurance
level of 20 percent, XYZ would pay $20 of a $100 liability; the insurer would pay $80. See
generally Mark S. Rhodes, Couch on Insurance § 62:123-25 at 598-99 (Law Co-op 2d ed
1983 & Supp 1996). "Excess insurance" refers to the practice of buying liability insurance
in layers. For example, an insured may purchase from insurer A coverage for any liability
less than $1 million per occurrence. It then purchases from B a policy providing coverage
for liability in excess of $1 million and less than $10 million per occurrence. The policy
purchased from B is "excess" insurance. See generally Abraham, Environmental Liability
Insurance Law at 223-33 (cited in note 5).
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cation formula on a case-by-case basis, using the basic frame-
work provided above.''
Because it actually allocates liability among the various trig-
gered insurance policies and periods of self-insurance, the
Owens-Illinois method is superior to the Keene and stacking
methods. However, this method is not without its drawbacks.
First, it tends to maximize coverage in individual cases and dis-
proportionately assign liability to generous policies, dispropor-
tionately increasing their price, thus making them more difficult
to purchase.
Furthermore, it increases transaction costs by requiring a
special master to apply the deceptively simple formula on a case-
by-case basis. The special master must examine periods of self-
insurance and estimate how much coverage was "purchased"
during those periods, allocating liability to those periods accord-
ingly. Several factors complicate the special master's calculation.
The policies triggered in a progressive injury case will not be
identical. Deductible and coinsurance levels will vary, as will
policy limits. Moreover, different policy periods may or may not
have excess insurance coverage. The Owens-Illinois court antici-
pated this objection and noted that, compared to the total
amounts involved, the expense of hiring a special master is rela-
tively small.0 2 The court failed, however, to guide the special
master through complications such as deductibles and excess in-
surance.
With the special master's wide discretion under the Owens-
Illinois method, outcomes will likely be less predictable. Since
allocation is to be determined on a case-by-case basis, parties will
not know how the special master in a particular case will handle
deductibles, coinsurance, self-insurance, excess insurance, and
other variables when determining the liability of each insurer.' 3
' Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 994.
"'Id at 995. The court cited to John H. Gross, Strategic Considerations in Coverage
Litigation, in Barry R. Ostrager and Thomas R. Newman, eds, 11th Annual Insurance,
Excess, and Reinsurance Coverage Disputes 7 (PLI-Litigation Course Handbook Series
No. H-494) (1993), which provides a case history of the use of a special master to stream-
line a non-allocation-related litigation process.
'"For example, assume that in years one through three XYZ purchased insurer A's
policy, with a policy limit of $10 million and a deductible of $500,000. In years four
through six, XYZ purchased a policy from insurer B with a $20 million limit, but in order
to keep its premium down accepted a deductible of $2 million. In years seven through
nine XYZ decided that self-insurance would be more efficient and purchased from C an
excess insurance policy providing coverage only for liability in excess of $20 million. In
year fifteen, XYZ discovers that it will be liable for pollution damage caused by an occur-
rence that triggered all three policies.
Consider three scenarios. First, XYZ is liable for $1.5 million. Liability of $1.5 million
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This uncertainty does not arise from a mathematical impossibil-
ity of developing an allocation formula to handle these vari-
ables," 4 but from the courts' opportunity to tinker with results in
order to satisfy a desire to maximize insurance coverage in a par-
ticular case.' 5 This uncertainty will make it more difficult to set
premiums and will encourage wasteful litigation.'06
Even if courts developed (and, more importantly, consis-
tently used) a standard and predictable method, the Owens-
Illinois rule has the additional flaw of building "coverage maxi-
mization" into the formula. The special master will allocate more
liability to policies that provide greater coverage."0 7 Basically,
Owens-Illinois treats a progressive injury as a big pie. Because
there is no factual way to determine the size of the piece that
each insurer should get, Owens-Illinois gives the biggest slices to
the policy years that provided the greatest coverage. Years in
which the insured purchased less protection and assumed a
greater share of potential liabilities (in effect, self-insuring) will
be allocated smaller slices. Therefore, insurers pay a greater
share of the total damages-maximizing coverage.10
Allocating a greater proportion of liability to large insurance
policies, while perhaps intuitively appealing, ignores the realities
behind the formation of insurance agreements. Holding other fac-
tors (such as information and market conditions) constant, the
more coverage provided by an insurer, the higher the premium
charged. However, the higher premium is charged not because
there is a greater chance that a larger injury will occur during
in a single year would cause A to pay $1 million. But if this same liability was incurred in
a year covered by B, or in a self-insured year, XYZ would bear the full amount because a
$1.5 million injury is still the responsibility of the insured. Second, XYZ is liable for $10
million. If this liability occurs in year one, A would be required to pay $9.5 million. The
same injury occurring in year five would require B to pay $8 million. If it occurred in year
eight, XYZ would be required to pay the full $10 million. Third, XYZ is liable for $50 mil-
lion. A $50 million claim would again require A to pay $9.5 million, but if B were liable it
would be required to pay $18 million. If this injury occurred in year eight, XYZ would
have to pay $20 million and C would pay $30 million. Thus, for smaller claims, XYZ gets
the most coverage from A. But for larger claims, B's and C's policies provide more cover-
age.g. See, for example, Tung Yin, Comment, Nailing Jello to a Wall: A Uniform Approach
for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in Products Liability Cases with Delayed
Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 Cal L Rev 1243, 1276-78 (1995) (proposing for-
mula including provision for deductible amount).
" See text accompanying notes 57-58.
"See text accompanying notes 7-9 and 46-48.
,C7 Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 993-94.
"See generally Stonewall Insurance, 54 Cal Rptr 2d at 205-07, citing Carriers Insur-
ance Co v American Policyholders' Insurance Co, 404 A2d 216, 221-22 (Me 1979) (stating
that allocation based on years of coverage multiplied by policy limits unfairly allocates
more liability toward high coverage policies).
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the time period covered by the larger policy. The insurer charges
a higher premium because of the increased payout possibility-a
$5 million policy will only cover half of a $10 million injury, while
a $10 million policy will cover the entire injury. Owens-Illinois
ignores this and assumes instead that a greater share of a pro-
gressive injury occurs during years with high coverage. 09 Of
course, insurers will realize that by providing generous coverage,
they invite a greater share of injuries, and will either further in-
crease premiums to reflect their increased liability or will refuse
to write policies providing more coverage than policies held by an
insured in preceding years.
D. The "Other Insurance" Clauses Method
Some courts have suggested using "other insurance" clauses
to allocate liability among successive insurers in progressive in-
jury cases"W Courts make this suggestion without discussing
how such clauses would allocate liability. "Other insurance"
clauses do not provide a solution to the allocation problem be-
cause they were not meant to allocate liability among successive
insurers, and because policies often have incompatible clauses.
There are three basic types of "other insurance" clauses.' A
"pro rata" clause provides that the insurer will be liable only for
its pro rata share of the loss, usually defined as either an equal
share of the loss or as the proportion of the policy's coverage limit
to the combined limits of all insurance covering the loss
(theoretically similar to the Owens-Illinois method). An "excess"
clause states that the policy will only indemnify for amounts over
the amount covered by other policies. Finally, an "escape" clause
"'Of course, in some situations, an insured will purchase more coverage because it
knows that a change in its activities will increase the likelihood and magnitude of injury.
In fact, the Owens-Illinois court stated this as one of its rationales. 650 A2d at 993. In
these cases, as in the Uniroyal case, it may be possible for a court to allocate liability
based on fact rather than on legal rule. See note 14. However, increasing coverage does
not necessarily mean that an insured's damage-causing activities, and thus the likelihood
of injury, have also increased. One might purchase higher policy limits because, for ex-
ample, juries are returning higher damage awards than they were in previous years, be-
cause symptoms of latent illness are beginning to appear, because of the risk of retroac-
tive liability, or because the insured activity is more dangerous than previously thought,
even if the level of activity has decreased. See, for example, Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc v
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co, 682 F2d 12, 23 (1st Cir 1982) (more insurance coverage
purchased despite decrease in damage-causing activities).
"See, for example, Keene, 667 F2d at 1050; J.H. France Refractories Co v Allstate In-
surance Co, 534 Pa 29, 626 A2d 502, 509 (1993).
..The following descriptions are taken from Marcy Louise Kahn, The "Other Insur-
ance" Clause, 19 Forum 591, 594-95 (1984).
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attempts to eliminate all coverage if any other coverage is avail-
able.
Regardless of the clause used, these clauses are not intended
as allocation devices between consecutive insurance policies.
They do not give insurers rights of contribution against other in-
surers; instead, they are individual contractual agreements be-
tween the insured and each insurer, designed to prevent the in-
sured from recovering multiple times for an injury that occurs at
one point of time.' The clauses refer to losses covered by other
insurance "on the same basis," that is, by policies concurrently
covering the same time period.' Allocation issues arise because
progressive injuries do not occur "on the same basis" for each in-
surance carrier; instead, consecutive policies are triggered be-
cause the policies cover different periods of time.""
An additional problem arises when the triggered policies
have incompatible clauses. For example, policy A may have an
excess clause while policy B has a pro rata clause."' In these fre-
quently recurring situations, the courts' responses are charac-
terized by "confusion, inconsistency and the absence of rational
guidelines for interpretation.""' Courts often disregard the
clauses and simply attempt to allocate liability based on some
other method."7
The inability of "other insurance" clauses to solve the alloca-
tion dilemma demonstrates the difficulty in attempting to solve
this problem contractually, rather than judicially or legislatively.
While allocation disputes are disputes primarily between insur-
ance companies, an insurance policy is an agreement between an
insurer and an insured. The policies do not give insurers contrac-
tual rights against other insurers that contracted with the in-
sured at different times."'
"'See, for example, Western Agricultural Insurance Co v Industrial Indemnity Insur-
ance Co, 838 P2d 1353, 1357 (Ariz App 1992).
.. Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 306 n 45 (cited in note 8). See also
Rhodes, Couch on Insurance § 62:93-96, 112 at 571-76, 588-89 (cited in note 100).
"'See, for example, Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 991 (noting that if the triggered poli-
cies do not overlap, other insurance clauses are not applicable). But see Barry R. Ostrager
and Thomas R. Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes § 9.01 at 281-82
(Prentice Hall Law & Bus 3d ed 1990) (citing cases where "other insurance" coverage
found for consecutive policies).
"See Kahn, 19 Forum at 593 (cited in note 111).
" Id.
'.See id at 596-98. See generally Keeton and Widiss, Insurance Law § 3.11(e) at 262-
67 (cited in note 6).
'"This limitation has not prevented the California Supreme Court from trying to allo-
cate liability based on nonexistent rights. That court recently stated that the allocation of
progressive injury liability "requires application of principles of contract law to the ex-
press terms and limitations of the various policies of insurance on the risk." Montrose
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Of course, the standard language of the CGL form could be
changed to select an allocation method. Presumably the insur-
ance industry would select the optimal (time-on-the-risk) method
and thus parties would have no incentive to modify the language
in individual contracts. This selection would ideally provide the
courts with the justification for using a consistent allocation
method. Unfortunately, as they have with pollution exclusion
clauses, courts may ignore this language to maximize coverage in
individual cases."9 This possibility reinforces the need for the
courts (or the legislatures) to select and consistently apply an
allocation method.
IV. THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION METHOD: TIME-ON-THE-RISK
PRORATION
The time-on-the-risk method, like the "coverage provided"
method in Owens-Illinois, allocates liability among triggered
policies. However, it uses only the time periods covered by each
insurer without considering the coverage limits of the triggered
policies. In Insurance Company of North America v Forty-Eight
Insulations, Inc, the Sixth Circuit faced a question similar to that
faced by the Owens-Illinois court: how to allocate twenty years of
asbestos liability among five different insurance companies. 20
The court prorated the liability, but used a formula much simpler
than that employed by the Owens-Illinois court. It allocated li-
ability based on time-on-the-risk without regard to the limits of
the policy.12 '
Chemical Corp v Admiral Insurance Co, 10 Cal 4th 656, 42 Cal Rptr 2d 324, 344 n 19
(1995). However, the court gave no guidance as to how this might be accomplished. In-
credibly, to support this proposition, the court then cited Insurance Co of North America v
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc, 633 F2d 1212 (6th Cir 1980), clarified by 657 F2d 814 (6th
Cir 1981), and Keene, 667 F2d 1034, cases that use almost identical policy language to
reach very different results. Because of this lack of guidance, three California courts that
have addressed the allocation issue recently have each used different methods. See note
98.
gSee text accompanying notes 57-63. See Abraham, 88 Colum L Rev at 960 (cited in
note 7) ("[J]udicial interpretations of policy language that insurers had regarded as fixed,
clear, and limiting have expanded the scope of coverage... [and] destabilize[d] the in-
suring function."). See generally id at 960-72.
' 633 F2d 1212, 1213-14 (6th Cir 1980), clarified by 657 F2d 814 (6th Cir 1981).
"'Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F2d at 1224-25. Other courts using this method in-
clude Northern States Power Co v Fidelity and Casualty Co of New York, 523 NW2d 657,




A. Application of the Time-on-the-Risk Method
The example used to illustrate the Owens-Illinois method
illustrates the time-on-the-risk method as well.'22 Since insurer A
covered XYZ for three of the nine years, it is liable for one-third
of the total liability. Similarly, insurers B and C, who each cov-
ered three years as well, each are liable for one-third of the total
liability. The same result would be reached by allocating one-
ninth of the total liability to each year.
The limits of the policies do not affect how much liability is
allocated to each policy, but the limits will affect total payout.
For example, if liability totaled $27 million, $3 million would be
allocated to each of the nine years of coverage. Because insurer A
only insured XYZ up to a total of $2 million per year, XYZ would
absorb $1 million a year in liability for years one through three.
But XYZ would receive full indemnification from the larger poli-
cies covering years four through nine.
Similarly, deductibles would not affect the total liability allo-
cated to each year, but would affect the total amount of liability
owed by the insurer. For example, if insurer B's policies, with a
limit of $3 million per year, had a deductible of $100,000 per
year, B would indemnify XYZ at $2.9 million per year. (XYZ
would pay the first $100,000 of liability per year, after which B
would cover the rest up to the limit of $3 million, a limit not
reached in this example.)"
Under the time-on-the-risk allocation method, self-insured
periods should be treated in the same way as insured periods,
with the insured paying 100 percent of the allocated liability for
the years in which it self-insured.'24 For example, if XYZ decided
to self-insure during years seven through nine, it would absorb
the entire $3 million of liability per year, for a total of $9 million
of liability.
B. Defense of Time-on-the-Risk
The time-on-the-risk method should be adopted by courts be-
cause its inherent simplicity promotes predictability, reduces in-
centives to litigate, and ultimately reduces premium rates.
Courts can easily administer the time-on-the-risk method.
Once a court determines the scope of the progressive injury, that
is, the total damage and the period of time from exposure to
"See text accompanying notes 99-100.
'"This result is the same as would occur if an instantaneous accident caused a one-
year liability of $3 million.
" Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F2d at 1224-25.
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manifestation, it can readily allocate the damages among the
triggered policies. The court divides the total damages by the
number of triggered years and simply allocates to each year the
result. If, for example, a certain policy spans three years out of a
total of ten triggered years, then thirty percent of the damages
will be allocated to that policy.
Unlike the Owens-Illinois method, the effects of deductibles,
excess insurance, and self-insurance are easy to calculate by pre-
tending that the policy's share of damages was the damage that
actually occurred during that policy period. The deductible, if
any, will apply against the allocated damages, because the dam-
ages arise from a single occurrence. If damages exceed the pol-
icy's limits, then either the insured or the insured's excess insur-
ance policy for that period must bear the cost of the excess dam-
ages.' During periods of self-insurance, the insured bears the
cost of all allocated damages.
The time-on-the-risk method has intuitive, commonsense
appeal, as noted by Judge Wald in her partial concurrence in
Keene:
It seems to me logical and fair ... to distribute the ultimate
financial responsibility on a pro rata basis among the vari-
ous insurance companies on line during the risk period, and
to include Keene as a self-insurer for the years when it
failed to take out any insurance. 126
The simplicity of the time-on-the-risk method removes many
of the incentives to litigate the allocation of damages. Since the
parties will know in advance how the court will allocate liability,
there is much less of the uncertainty that encourages wasteful
litigation."' As discussed, litigation costs in progressive injury
cases are almost as large as actual damage costs.'28 While there
will still be many issues to litigate, such as which policies are
triggered and total damages, reducing the amount of allocation
litigation should substantially decrease the costs of insurance.
In addition to decreasing the amount of litigation, this
method provides a way for insurance companies to estimate more
accurately total expected liability; as a result, premiums should
decline. Premiums reflect the uncertainty that exists in the in-
surance market and the possibility that courts will use a cover-
age maximization rule to allocate coverage. Uncertainty about
' Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 308 n 51 (cited in note 8).
667 F2d at 1058 (Wald concurring) (advocating time-on-the-risk approach).
"See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 555-59 (cited in note 8).
"See text accompanying notes 10-12.
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which allocation method will be used and how that method will
be applied increases the costs of insurance.'29 Consistent use of
the time-on-the-risk method will eliminate the concern about un-
certainty. Because this method, unlike the Owens-Illinois
method, does not rely on a case-by-case determination of how
much coverage was purchased, it also obviates the concern about
inconsistent application.'30
Critics of the time-on-the-risk method may object that it is
unfair to allocate the same amount of damages to low- and high-
coverage policies, presumably because the insured pays more for
the high-coverage policies.' 3' However, such allocation is entirely
fair. Policies will indemnify the insured only up to their policy
limits; if allocated damages are higher than a policy's limit, the
insurer will not be liable for the excess. As total damages in-
crease, high-coverage policies will pay more than low-coverage
policies, because the low-coverage policies' limits will be reached
earlier. And in some low-damage cases, policies that provide
much less total coverage will provide greater indemnification be-
cause of their lower deductible levels. Thus, policies with higher
limits will on average, but not always, pay more than policies
with low limits.
Critics might also object that the time-on-the-risk method
assumes that actual damages occurred evenly within each trig-
gered policy period. While this objection is almost surely correct,
other allocation methods share this defect. Progressive injuries
by definition do not occur within a single policy period (Keene),
nor do they magically gravitate toward periods with more cover-
age (Owens-Illinois). The time-on-the-risk method does not pre-
See text accompanying notes 7-9 and 46-48.
" The policies supporting the allocation of indemnity by the time-on-the-risk method
also support using this method to apportion the insurer's duty to defend an insured under
the standard CGL policy language. A liability insurer owes a duty to defend its insured
against third-party actions that seek damages potentially covered by the insured's policy.
As with indemnity, insurers have tried to avoid the costs of the duty to defend, and courts
have allocated this duty inconsistently. Compare Keene, 667 F2d at 1050-51 & n 37
(imposing joint and several liability but allowing later allocation among insurers), with
Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F2d at 1225 (allocating defense costs using the time-on-the-
risk method), and Owens-Illinois, 650 A2d at 994-95 (allocating defense costs based on the
proportion of total coverage provided). As with allocating indemnity, the time-on-the-risk
method reduces uncertainty and the incentives to litigate. In addition, using the same
method to allocate indemnity and defense ensures that insurance companies bear the
same proportion of both costs and reduces the risk that they will engage in strategic be-
havior by, for example, settling a claim quickly in order to minimize defense costs (which
it may bear itself) at the expense of negotiating a better settlement (the benefits of which
may be allocated among several insurers). See Sykes, 72 Tex L Rev at 1346 (cited in note
84).
.. See, for example, Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv L Rev at 1583-84 (cited in note 7).
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tend to base allocation on the "facts" because these facts are un-
available. Because facts cannot be used to allocate the damages,
other considerations must prevail.
In addition, the method's simplicity may lead to some
strained applications. Consider the treatment of deductibles.
Many policies have a "per occurrence" deductible. However, by
definition, a progressive injury is caused by one occurrence. This
leads to the possibility that the damages caused by a single oc-
currence may force an insured to meet several "per occurrence"
deductibles.
One might suggest using a formula to determine the
"average size" of the deductible purchased and then proportion-
ally allocate this deductible to the various triggered policies.132
However, such a complication erodes the superiority of the time-
on-the-risk method, a superiority grounded in simplicity. A sim-
pler method would force the insured to meet the deductible for
each policy.
Making the insured meet each deductible would avoid waste-
ful litigation among insurers and with the insured over the
proper allocation formula.'33 A deductible only allocates a loss be-
tween an insured and an insurer; it does not make the loss dis-
appear. Any litigation over deductibles concerns only distribu-
tion; the ideal rule would eliminate this litigation. If fewer losses
are allocated to insurers because insureds must meet multiple
deductibles, premiums should shrink to reflect this change. In-
sureds who do not wish to run the risk of being forced to meet
several deductibles can pay extra for policies with minimal de-
'"For example, assume XYZ had three different policies within a three-year span.
Policy'A had no deductible. Policy B had a $3,000 deductible. Policy C had a $6,000 de-
ductible. The average deductible for the three years would be $3,000 ($9,000 in total de-
ductibles divided by three years). XYZ would be forced to pay $3,000 out-of-pocket before
the remaining damages were allocated among the insurance companies. Complications
arise, however. Because A had no deductible, why should A receive the benefit of the
other policies' deductibles, especially since A charged a higher premium for the lack of
deductible? Another approach would allow no part of the deductible to be allocated to A; it
would have to pay claims starting with the first dollar of damages. Of the remaining two
policies, policy B provided one-third of the total deductible and C provided two-thirds.
Therefore, B would be allocated $1,000 of the deductible. Of the damages allocated to the
B policy period (one-third the total damages), XYZ would need to pay $1,000 before B pro-
vided coverage. C's policy period would be treated similarly. This tortured, confusing, and
manipulable result further demonstrates the need for an easily administrable and pre-
dictable approach.
"However, the insurers would more readily settle because the amounts involved
would be smaller. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 555-59 (cited in note 8)




ductibles. The certainty gained will lower total costs more effec-
tively than any alternative.
A close examination suggests that the simple method has
logical as well as practical appeal. One reason to define progres-_
sive injuries as caused by a single occurrence is the lack of facts
that would allow parties to determine exactly when and how the
injury occurred. For example, years of pollution at a site may be
treated as caused by one occurrence. However, this pollution may
have been caused by two distinct operations-the use of chemi-
cals in the company's operations and the on-site storage of waste
products. If the court could ascertain the amount of cleanup costs
attributable to each activity, each activity could be treated as a
separate occurrence.'" Policies would be triggered and damage
allocated for each occurrence; the insured would be forced to
meet two "per occurrence" deductibles, even if it were insured by
one policy during the whole period. Because costs cannot be allo-
cated to the activities causing the damages, however, the entire
operation is considered one occurrence, and the insured need only
meet one deductible. Making the insured meet a deductible for
each policy tracks somewhat what could occur if more informa-
tion were available.
CONCLUSION
Courts should choose a method for allocating progressive
injury liability that minimizes the present and future costs of
progressive injuries. The time-on-the-risk method limits the cost
of injuries that have already occurred by minimizing litigation
costs-costs that are often larger than the cost of the original
injury.
The time-on-the-risk method also reduces future progressive
injury damages. The method encourages companies to insure.
The monitoring and internalization functions of insurance en-
courage companies to minimize future progressive injury costs.
As a result, future progressive injury damages decline.
Insurance companies also bear the duty to defend the in-
sured. These defense costs should be allocated using time-on-the-
risk, both to minimize litigation costs and to minimize the costs
of strategic negotiation.
"See, for example, Hickman and DeYoung, 17 N Ky L Rev at 297 (cited in note 8) (A
progressive injury can often be seen either as the result of one continuous act or of multi-
ple acts.).
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